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INSURANCE: EXCLUSIONARY
ENDORSEMENTS: BOHRN v. STATE FARM
MUTUAL AUTO. INS. CO. (CAL. 1964)
On January 1, 1961, Billy Bohrn, while driving his father's car
on an errand to the grocery store, struck and injured a pedestrian.
Billy was alone in the car, but he had his parents' permission to
use it. Billy's father had a policy with State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co., containing an endorsement excluding coverage
to the son except when accompanied by the named insured or the
named insured's spouse. The son had another policy with Farmers
Insurance Exchange on his own car as an assigned risk. The pedes-
trian sued both the father and the son. They in turn instituted an
action for declaratory judgment against State Farm, demanding
that State Farm defend them and acknowledge financial responsi-
bility to the limits of their policy. "
State Farm denied coverage because of the endorsement and
alleged that if any responsibility did attach, Farmers would be
primarily liable, and State Farm would be liable only in the event of
an excess. However, the trial court held that the exclusionary en-
dorsement was against public policy and therefore null and void.
State Farm was found to be primarily liable and Farmers liable for
the excess. State Farm appealed, asserting that an insurance com-
pany has the right to insure and select its own risks and to decline
exposure to known dangerous risks.1 The court held that any such
limitation must conform to the law, and if this limitation is contrary
to public policy, it is void. The court noted that State Farm's stan-
dard policy conformed to Vehicle Code Section 16451,2 defining ad-
ditional insureds as "any person driving with the permission of the
insured." However, the question of whether the insurance company
could limit, by appropriate restrictive endorsements, coverage to
permissive users was answered in the negative.
The court's decision to hold the exclusionary endorsement
null and void was based primarily on Wildman v. Government
Employees' which set forth the following rule of public policy: "For
an insurer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover an
accident which occurs when a person, other than the named insured,
1 Bohrn v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 226 A.C.A. 611, 38 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1964). The record disclosed that Billy had been involved in a number of
automobile accidents.
2 CAL. VEH. CODE § 16451; formerly CAL. VEH. CODE § 415 (1935).
3 Wildman v. Gov't Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957).
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is driving with the permission and consent of the named insured, is
a violation of the public policy of this state as set forth in Sections
402 and 415 of the Vehicle Code." The court said that such laws
must be considered a part of every policy of liability insurance, even
though the policy itself does not specifically make such laws a part
thereof.
The legislature modified Vehicle Code Section 415 twice after
the Wildman case, but the court refused to accept either of these
modifications as evidencing an intent to change Wildman. The 1957
amendment to Section 415 had the effect of making it dependent
on Vehicle Code Section 414.' This change could have been inter-
preted as evidencing a legislative intent to limit the application of
Section 415 only to those policies certified by an insurance carrier
to the Department of Motor Vehicles under Section 414. However,
in Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.,5 the court re-jected such an interpretation because it would have limited the
application of Wildman to the small (less than 1% of the total)
number of liability policies which are certified annually to the
Department of Motor Vehicles. It went on further to say that there
was no sufficiently cogent and convincing evidence for the court
to attribute to the legislature the intent to overturn a sound rule
of public policy.
Another minor change in Section 415 occurred when it was
recodified in 1959. Subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) were recodified
separately as Sections 16450, 16451, and 16452 respectively. The
opening words were changed from "Such" to "An." Judging from
the court's handling of the 1957 modification, it is clear that these
minor changes similarly were not sufficient to overturn the Wildman
case.
State Farm also contended that the exclusionary ban only
applied to groups or classes of permissive drivers and not to named
individuals. It supported its argument on a sentence from Interin-
surance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.:' "Any provision in a policy
which purported to exclude certain classes of permissive users from
coverage was declared to be contrary to this public policy and, there-
fore, void." But the court rejected this contention as contrary to
the liberal construction the California Supreme Court places upon
the entire automobile financial responsibility law.' The court simi-
4 CAL. VEI. CODE § 414 (1935).
5 Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 373 P.2d 640,
23 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1962).
6 Id. at 150, 373 P.2d at 644, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
7 Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 424, 296 P.2d801, 808 (1956). Court used liberal construction to give "monetary protection to
[Vol. 5
1964] RECENT DECISIONS
larly rejected the other contentions of State Farm which would have
made the exclusion effective.
Thus, the limitation that Billy must be accompanied by one of
his parents when he operated the car resulted in a void exclusion.
The fact that Farmers insured Billy as an assigned risk at a higher
premium did not constitute unjust enrichment to Farmers when
State Farm was made primarily liable, because the two policies
were of standard form as to "other coverage," and the court fol-
lowed the rule that the excess provision of the policy of the driver
should be given effect.' This renders the insurer of the owner of the
vehicle primarily liable for the whole loss, within the limits of its
policy.
Following Wildman, the courts nullified the following attempted
exclusions: garage exclusion; 9 customer exclusion; 'o excluding other
than the named insured; " drivers over 60 years old; 12 and the
military personnel exclusion.' 3
EFFECT OF INSURANCE CODE SECTION 11580.1
This section was not applied in Bohrn because it became effec-
tive after the policy was issued to Mr. Bohrn, and it was not given
retroactive effect. If the present law had been applicable, Billy
would have been excluded from coverage. Insurance Code Section
11580.1(e)' 4 specifically authorizes insurance policies bearing en-
dorsements which exclude a natural person or persons designated
by name. Section 11580.1(f) specifically authorizes insurance poli-
cies excluding coverage to a user of the described automobile other
than named insured, provided such user has other valid and col-
lectible insurance. If there is no such other valid and collectible
that ever changing and tragically large group of persons who while lawfully using
the highways themselves suffer grave injury through the negligent use of those
highways by others."
8 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d
675 (1959).
9 Exchange Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal. 2d 613, 364 P.2d 833, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1961).
10 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d
675 (1959).
11 Bonfils v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 152, 331 P.2d 766 (1958).
12 Cassin v. Financial Indem. Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 631, 325 P.2d 228 (1958).
13 Wheeling v. Financial Indem. Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 36, 19 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1962).
14 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1(e): Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions,
the insurer and any named insured may, by the terms of such policy or by a
separate writing, agree that coverage under the policy shall not apply while said
motor vehicles are being used by a natural person or persons designated by name.
Such agreement by any named insured shall be binding upon every insured to
whom such policy applies.
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insurance, the coverage afforded a person other than the named
insured may be limited to the financial responsibility requirements
specified in Section 16059 of the Vehicle Code. Thus, a permissive
user may be afforded only $10,000 for all damages arising out of
bodily injury sustained by one person and $20,000 for two or more
persons in any one accident, whereas a named insured under the
policy has higher limits available for his own protection. Vehicle
Code Section 16450 was also amended at this time to provide that
any requirement set forth in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Division 7
of the Vehicle Code (relating to motor vehicle liability policies)
would apply only to those policies which were certified as proof
of ability to respond in damages, as provided in Vehicle Code Sec-
tion 16431.
As a result of this legislation the law is restored to a status
which is similar, although not identical, to that which existed prior
to the Wildman case. From the date of the Wildman decision until
September 20, 1963, all exclusionary endorsements are illegal and
completely unenforceable. This legislative change was not made
retroactive, therefore, it can not revitalize an unenforceable ex-
clusion of a policy issued before September 20, 1963, even though
the loss involved occurred after the effective date of the enactments.
This is in accordance with the general rule that an illegal contract
is not validated by later statutory changes.1"
While these changes have not yet been tested in the courts,
there is no reason to doubt that they will not be given effect. Cer-
tainly they represent cogent and convincing evidence of legislative
intent to abrogate the rule of public policy in Wildman.
TRAcY N. TUMLIN
15 Interinsurance Exch. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 142, 373 P.2d 640,
23 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1962).
